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OPINION
                              
Chertoff, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises out of the
settlement of a complex multidistrict
federal mass tort class action.  As part of
the complicated settlement agreement,
class members were entitled to opt out at
various stages.  Those who chose to opt
out initially were freed to pursue their
remedies elsewhere.  Those who did not
opt out at the beginning were afforded
opportunities to opt out “downstream” at
an intermediate stage or at the “back-end.”
But those downstream opt-out rights were
not absolute.  Rather, members who
elected to delay an opt-out beyond the
initial stage were informed that they would
4not have unfettered ability to litigate all
claims elsewhere.  Instead, among other
things, these so-called intermediate and
back-end class “opt-outs” were precluded
under the settlement agreement from
pursuing punitive, exemplary, or multiple
damages.
The questions presented here arise
from the District Court’s efforts to enforce
the terms of the settlement against
intermediate opt-out class members now
litigating their claims in various state
courts.  What appellee class counsel and
appellee defendant fear is that counsel for
intermediate opt-outs will undermine the
efficacy of the settlement by evading or
circumventing the punitive damages
restrictions to which they are bound under
the agreement.  Appellants, who are
individual intermediate opt-outs now
pressing claims in state court, complain
that the District Court has gone beyond
enforcing the plain restrictions of the
settlement and has taken steps that will
hamper or defeat plaintiffs’ ability to
pursue claims that are not barred by the
settlement.
In one sense, the issues framed in
the appeal reflect efforts by creative
counsel on both sides to interpret and
apply settlement terms so as to gain
advantage in the individual lawsuits
brought by intermediate opt-outs in
various state courts.  But larger
institutional and fairness issues are at
stake.  
The nationwide class settlement is
a device that holds the promise of
resolving millions of claims in a way that
affords deserving claimants some measure
of relief while preserving a defendant
business as a viable entity that can actually
pay compensation. See In re Gen. Motors
Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir.
1995).  All claimants benefit from such an
outcome, because each has a fair
opportunity at recovery.  Later claimants
need not fear that the fund will be
exhausted before their turn comes, or that
the defendant will undertake a scorched
earth defense that consumes assets
otherwise available for compensation, or
simply turn off the spigot by filing for
bankruptcy.  The defendant, too, obviously
benefits from a limit to liability that
ensures corporate survival.  For this type
of global settlement to work, however, the
district court must successfully discharge
the herculean task of enforcing the terms
of the class settlement agreement against
the constant pressure of some settlement
class members who, having obtained part
of a loaf through the agreement, now
pursue alternative avenues to obtain
additional slices.  Otherwise, individual
class members’ activities “would be
disruptive to the district court’s ongoing
settlement management and would
jeopardize the settlement’s fruition.”
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d
189, 204 (3d Cir. 1993).
As appealing as the efficiencies of
a nationwide mass tort class settlement
may be, however, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly cautioned that they cannot
override fundamental principles of due
5process or faithful application of
controlling law. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845-48 (1999);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 620 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Corp.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
Because a class settlement disposes of the
rights of many people who are absent from
the proceeding and only virtually
represented by class counsel, due process
considerations such as adequacy of notice
and adequacy of representation have
special force. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 847-48.
As we observed in our opinion in Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc.—in a passage
endorsed by the Supreme Court, see 521
U.S. at 628—inadequacies in the quality of
notice raise “serious fairness concerns.” 83
F.3d 610, 634 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Moreover, when a federal court
seeks to effectuate a settlement agreement
by way of enjoining state court
proceedings, additional constraints qualify
its authority.  We have held that district
courts have the authority under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to protect
their jurisdiction by enjoining state court
proceedings that interfere with a judicially
approved settlement. See In re Prudential
Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 314 F.3d
99, 103-05 (3d Cir. 2002) (hereinafter
Prudential II); In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 233-39 (3d Cir.
2002) (hereinafter Diet Drugs I).  But the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and
federalism concerns circumscribe this
power and require that it be “construed
narrowly” and invoked sparingly. Diet
Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 233-34.  The power of
federal courts to intrude into the domain of
state courts administrating their own laws
implicates a host of sensitive concerns and
is therefore limited. See, e.g., Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
600-01 (1975).  
 In addition, as with any injunction,
traditional principles of equity apply.  The
terms of any injunction, for example, must
be commensurate with the violation the
court seeks to remedy.  And practical
considerations such as manageability and
enforceability militate against an order that
enmeshes a district court in protracted
micromanagement of litigation in a state
court.  These principles of equity
counseling restraint take on particular
significance when issues of federalism are
involved.  When federal courts are
confronted with requests for relief that
require interference with state civil
functions, “they should abide by standards
of restraint that go well beyond those of
private equity jurisprudence.” Huffman,
420 U.S. at 603.
All of these concerns come to bear
on our resolution of the appeal from the
District Court’s orders in this case.  For the
reasons stated in this opinion, we agree
that the District Court had power under the
All Writs Act to supervise and curtail the
actions of intermediate opt-out class
members in pursuing their individual
claims.  But we believe that the injunctions
imposed some restrictions not fairly
comprehended within the terms of the
settlement agreement and class notice and,
in certain ways, transgressed the limits of
6federalism and prudence that confine the
exercise of federal judicial authority.
Emphatically, the District Court is
empowered to protect its jurisdiction and
effectuate the settlement agreement.  In
this case, however, elements of the
protective orders in question must be
refashioned to be consistent with fair class
notice, to respect appropriate boundaries in
relation to state courts, and to accord with
t r ad it i ona l pr incip les  of  e qui t y
jurisprudence.
I.
A.
The history of this litigation was
previously detailed in our opinion in Diet
Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 225-29.  The cases
marshaled before the District Court arose
from the marketing of two appetite
suppressants, fenfluramine (sold as
“Pondimin”) and dexfenfluramine (sold as
“Redux”).  Appellee American Home
Products1 removed the drugs from the
market in September of 1997, after data
came to light suggesting a link between
use of the drugs and valvular heart damage
(“VHD”) and after the United States Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued
a public health advisory alert.  By that
time, four million people had taken
Pondimin over the previous two years, and
two million people had taken Redux. 
Following the FDA’s issuance of
the public health warning and Wyeth’s
withdrawal of the diet drugs from the
market, approximately eighteen thousand
individual lawsuits and over one hundred
putative class actions were filed in federal
and state courts around the country.  Most
plaintiffs alleged that the drugs caused
them to suffer from VHD.  A small
fraction claimed the drugs caused them to
suf fer f rom pr imary pu lmonary
hypertension (“PPH,” a rare and often fatal
lung disease), neurotoxic injuries, or other
assorted injuries.  In December of 1997,
the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict
Litigation transferred all the federal
actions to Judge Louis Bechtle in the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, creating
Multidistrict Litigation 1203 (“MDL
1203”).2
In April of 1999, Wyeth began
“global” settlement talks with plaintiffs in
the federal action together with several
plaintiffs in similar state class actions.
The parties reached a tentative settlement
agreement for a nationwide class in
November of 1999.  Soon thereafter, on
November 23, 1999, the District Court
conditionally certified a nationwide
settlement class and, concurrently,
preliminarily approved the settlement. 
The Court scheduled a fairness
hearing for May 1, 2000 on class
1 American Home Products changed
its name to Wyeth in March of 2002.  We
use the name Wyeth for the remainder of
the opinion.
2 Judge Bechtle has since retired,
and Judge Harvey Bartle, III, now presides
over MDL 1203.
7certification and final settlement approval.
On August 28, 2000, the District Court
entered a final order certifying the class
and approving the settlement.
B.
The settlement agreement embraces
all persons who took Pondimin or Redux.
Wyeth undertook to pay up to $3.75 billion
(present value) to fund benefits to
members of the class.  Settling class
members agreed in return to release Wyeth
from all claims arising out of their
ingestion of the drugs, other than claims
based on PPH brought by individuals who
met certain medical criteria.
The agreement was crafted to avoid
an all-or-nothing choice at the threshold.
Rather, several opt-out points were
envisioned at various places along the
continuum of the settlement period.
Putative class members who wished to opt
out entirely from the settlement, foregoing
all benefits and any restrictions, were
obliged to file their opt-out notices by
March 30, 2000.  Drug users who chose
not to opt out initially became settlement
class members, bound not to assert “settled
claims” against Wyeth except as the
agreement permits.3  
The agreement allows class
members who are medically and otherwise
eligible opportunities to opt out at a later
time, at an intermediate stage.4  Those who
choose to opt out at an intermediate stage
receive no compensation but are permitted
to pursue most of their “settled claims”
individually, subject to certain restrictions.
The settlement agreement provides, in
relevant part:
[Intermediate opt-outs] may
n o t  s e e k  p u n i t i v e ,
exemplary, or any multiple
damages against [Wyeth and
other released parties]; . . . .
[Intermediate opt-outs] may
not use any previous
verdicts  or judgments
against [Wyeth], or factual
findings necessary to such
verdicts or judgments, for
purposes of establishing
claims or facts in order to
obtain a verdict or judgment
. . . .  Nor may [an
intermediate opt-out] . . .
seek to introduce into
evidence against [Wyeth],
for any purpose, such a
verdict, judgment or factual
finding.
Joint App. 616-17.
In return for intermediate opt-outs’
3 “Settled claims” generally
included all conceivable claims arising out
of purchase and use of the diet drugs but
specifically excluded, among other things,
claims based on PPH.
4 Some class members who did not
exercise an intermediate opt-out reserved
a so-called “back-end” opt-out right.
Back-end opt-out rights are not at issue in
this appeal.
8acceptance of the limitation on punitive
and multiple damages, Wyeth agreed not
to assert any statute of limitations, laches,
or claims-splitting defenses against
allowed individual claims.
In approving the settlement, the
District Court expressly relied in part on
the finding that “class members had an
opportunity to preserve their punitive
damages claims by exercising the initial
opt out.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042,
at *49 n.22 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000)
(“Memorandum and Pretrial Order No.
1415,” hereinafter “PTO 1415”).  The
District Court also observed that the
waiver of punitive damages was not an
inappropriate “trade-off,” since “punitive
damage claims are often illusory” and
subject to judicial limitation or reduction
as a matter of fairness to the defendant. Id.
In addition, the District Court expressly
retained jurisdiction to “enforce the
Settlement in accordance with its terms; 
. . . and to enter such other and further
orders as are needed to effectuate the terms
of the Settlement.” Id. at *72.
This Court affirmed PTO 1415
without opinion. In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 275 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 2001).
C.
A number of class members who
did not exercise their initial opt-out rights
elected to opt out at the intermediate stage.
Plaintiffs Clara Clark and Linda Smart,
both represented by the Texas law firm of
Fleming & Associates, filed lawsuits in
Texas state court.  Clark sued Wyeth and
her physician in 2002, alleging claims of
negligence, products liability, improper
warnings, and fraud.  Clark’s final
amended petition seeks recovery of
compensa tory damages,  including
damages for pain, disfigurement, mental
anguish, and medical expenses.  Likewise,
Smart’s petition alleges claims against
Wyeth and her physician for actual
damages for pain, disfigurement, anguish,
and medical expenses arising from state
tort claims of negligence, failure to warn,
and design defect.
Meanwhile, in state court in
Mississippi, class member Lonelle James,
and others, also filed claims against Wyeth
after exercising their intermediate opt-out
rights.  James was selected as the first trial
plaintiff.  Her claims were based on state
law theories of negligence, strict liability
for design and marketing defect,
inadequate and improper warnings,
misrepresentation, and breach of implied
warranty.  James sought compensatory
damages—including damages for pain and
m e n t a l  ang u i sh ,  l o s t e a r n i n g s,
disfigurement, physical impairment,
medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment
of life—from both Wyeth and her
physician. 
 Plaintiffs’ state court claims were
pleaded in terms that appeared to abide by
the terms of the settlement preclusion of
punitive and multiple damages.  But the
actual conduct of the litigation raised
justifiable fear in the District Court, and
among the counsel for defendant and the
class, that the plaintiffs were seeking to
obtain through the back door what they
9were barred from receiving through the
front.  Reviewing the state court
submissions by Clark’s counsel, the
District Court found—and this is
undisputed— that Clark’s case summary
was “replete with statements leading
ineluctably to the conclusion that such
punitive damages are being sought, even
though not by that name.” In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593,
Memorandum and Pretrial Order No.
2625, at 2 (E.D. Pa. filed October 16,
2002) (hereinafter “PTO 2625”).  Clark’s
case summary expressed the intent to offer
evidence concerning “‘tens of thousands
of people [who] were injured’”; Wyeth’s
guilt of “‘corporate avarice’”; and its
alleged “‘goal of increasing profits at the
expense of human life.’” Id. at 2-3.  Worse
yet, another submission (in a perhaps
Freudian slip) averred that, among other
things, “‘[p]laintiff seeks punitive
damages.’” Id. at 4.  Before the District
Court, Clark’s counsel disavowed that
claim as an error.  The District Court
concluded, however, that Clark’s counsel
was seeking to “circumvent” the punitive
damages bar and enjoined him from:
introducing any evidence or
making any statement
before or argument to the
court or jury related directly
or indirectly to (a) punitive,
exemplary or multiple
d a m a g e s ,  h o w e v e r
d e s c r i b e d ;  a n d  ( b )
malicious, wanton or other
similar conduct of Wyeth,
however described; . . . [or]
any medical condition of
plaintiff caused by Wyeth
other than mitral valve
regurgitation [VHD] or
pulmonary hypertension
secondary to mitral valve
regurgitation.  
Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.
Soon thereafter counsel Fleming’s
other client, Linda Smart, found her state
court case brought to the attention of the
District Court.  The District Court noted
that Fleming was obviously aware of the
ruling in the Clark litigation, but
nevertheless had submitted a proposed jury
charge containing inflammatory language
and references to destruction of evidence
and a cover up.  The District Court
rejected the contention that this evidence
was admissible on issues properly before
the state trial court and concluded that 
to allow a class member to
introduce into evidence or to
argue the elements of a
punitive damage claim on
the condition that he or she
does not specifically request
punitive damages by name.
. . . would create a giant
loophole.
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
99-20953, Memorandum and Pretrial
Order No. 2680, at 7 (E.D. Pa. filed
December 11, 2002) (hereinafter “PTO
2680”).  Consequently, the Court issued an
injunction similar to that in the Clark case.
Only a few weeks later, Wyeth
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returned to District Court once again to
address Clark.  Reviewing Clark’s
amended trial exhibit list, the District
Court observed that it demonstrated
“counsel’s motive to infect the trial with
improper bad conduct evidence concerning
Wyeth.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 99-20593, Memorandum and
Pretrial Order No. 2717 at 3 (E.D. Pa. filed
January 29, 2003) (hereinafter “PTO
2717”).  At the same time—and
significantly—the District Court quoted
the state trial judge, who expressed his
commitment to assure “‘a fair verdict that
is an approximation of the damages and
not a result of them [the jury] being
incensed.’” Id. at 4.  The District Court
concluded that counsel Fleming had
merely withdrawn certain submissions and
substituted others in an effort to
circumvent the prior injunctions. 
The District Court held Fleming in
civil contempt and issued an order, PTO
2717, enjoining Clark and her counsel
from commencing the state trial until
Fleming submitted, and the Court
approved, a statement under oath that he
would obey PTO 2625.  The order
provided: 
That statement must declare
that with respect to Wyeth’s
conduct he will not inject
into the case any evidence,
statement, or argument,
directly or indirectly, that
connotes more than simple
negligence or defective
design without fault.  The
statement must also declare
that he will not introduce at
the trial any reference to
Wyeth’s size, financial
condition, or worth.  He
must also include as part of
his statement his trial
exhibits, witness list, and
points for charge . . . .
Id. at ¶ 2. 
Back in Texas, the trial judge in the
Clark case held an extensive pretrial
conference.  On February 5, 2003, State
District Judge Dennis Powell issued an
extensive thirteen-page pretrial order.
Judge Powell’s carefully reasoned and
written opinion exhibited understanding of
the effect of the settlement preclusion and
a determination to honor it.  The State
District Judge perceptively observed that
“not surprisingly, the plaintiff wants to try
the case in a manner that will maximize
the chances of a significant recovery, and,
not surprisingly, the defendant wants to try
the case in a manner that will minimize the
chances of a significant recovery.” Joint
App. 1281.  Accordingly, the state court
flatly prohibited evidence relevant only to
punitive or exemplary damages and
evidence relevant to other issues but
unduly prejudicial or misleading.  At the
same time, Judge Powell said he would
not require the plaintiff to
“try the case in a vacuum of
the defendant’s design,”
which could result in the
jury improperly speculating
about liability issues and
evidence (or the lack
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thereof) and factoring such
speculations into causation
i s s u e s  o r  d a m a g e
evaluations.
Id. at 1282.
A good deal of the state pretrial
order is devoted to analyzing Wyeth’s
purported willingness to stipulate or
concede certain issues so as to remove
them from the case.  This offer—which
was brandished by Wyeth before the
federal District Court during the Fleming
contempt proceeding that led to PTO
2717—presumably would have eliminated
any proper incentive for Clark to offer
inflammatory evidence as part of a
negligence or design case.  But the State
Distric t  Judge,  armed with his
understandably greater familiarity with
Texas tort law, found Wyeth’s apparent
concessions to be less than they appeared.
As he pointed out, the proposed
concessions, which would supposedly
leave only causation and damages in the
case, would actually do no such thing.  In
the words of Judge Powell:
Likewise the defendant
created the impression
before [U.S. District] Judge
Bartle that “they [Wyeth]
also admitted that the injury
was foreseeable,” and that
“the injury is foreseeable
f r o m  t h e  d efec t ive ly
d e s i g n e d  p r o d u c t . ”
Nonetheless, contrary to the
representations to both
cour ts , the [proposed
concession] contains no
finding that the injury was
f o r e s e e a b l e  b y  t h e
defendant, or that the injury
was foreseeable from the
d e f e c t i v e l y  d e s i g n ed
product.  The law requires
proof, the plaintiff pleaded
it, the defendant refused to
admit it was conceded, but
then the defendant does not
want the plaintiff to put on
evidence on that element.
Id. at 1288-89.
The state trial court noted an
additional problem: the proposed
concessions would place the court in a
dilemma.  If certain issues were taken
from the case with no actual admission by
Wyeth, it would require the court to
instruct the jury that defendant would be
automatically liable if the plaintiff’s injury
were caused by Wyeth’s drug, without
regard to fault.  But this is a matter that
could affect jury voir dire, Judge Powell
explained, and might require striking
potential jurors who could not return a
verdict on damages without “considering
whether absolute liability law was fair or
not.” Id. at 1290.
For these reasons, Judge Powell
declined to accept Wyeth’s concessions in
their tendered form, although he remained
open to a stipulation of outright admission
on one or more of the elements of any
cause of action.  “No doubt some evidence
that would be relevant to liability would
also be relevant to causation, but this
12
submission would greatly simplify the
evidence . . . .” Id. at 1291.
Evidently, the parties found this
invitation unappealing, and the action
moved again to federal court in
Philadelphia.  In March of 2003, the
District Court conducted a lengthy
conference and reviewed and ruled on
voluminous deposition excerpts and
proposed trial exhibits to determine
whether the settlement agreement barred
Clark from offering them into evidence at
trial.  The District Court entered an order
that enforces a series of prophylactic
prohibitions against introducing evidence
deemed relevant only to punitive damages
or unfairly prejudicial when balanced
against probative value. 
First, the order forbids plaintiffs
from offering into evidence a list of
specific exhibits and deposition testimony.
And, except as specifically allowed by the
accompanying memorandum, it prohibits
counsel from “making any statement or
argument to the court or jury related
directly or indirectly” to the forbidden
evidence.  The District Court ruled, for
example, that Clark (1) could attack the
credibility of certain medical review
articles by proving they were funded by
Wyeth, but not by showing that they were
actually ghostwritten at the behest of
Wyeth; (2) could not offer any evidence of
concealment of information or destruction
of documents; (3) must redact portions of
documents suggesting problems with
Wyeth’s diligence in reporting serious
side-effects of the drugs to the FDA; and
(4) must redact an internal Wyeth
memorandum to eliminate the phrase “the
public is increasingly concerned and afraid
of the drug.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 20593, Memorandum and
Pretrial Order No. 2828 (E.D. Pa. filed
April 8, 2003) (hereinafter “PTO 2828”).
Second, the order bars Clark and
her attorneys from “introducing any
evidence, making any statement before or
argument to the court or jury, related
directly or indirectly to”:
[1] punitive, exemplary or
multiple damages, however
described; 
[2] malicious, wanton or
other similar conduct of
Wyeth, however described;
. . .
[3] any medical condition of
plaintiff caused by Wyeth
other than left-sided mitral
valve regurgitation or
pulmonary hypertension
secondary to mitral valve
regurgitation; 
. . . .
[4] Wyeth’s profits, size or
financial condition;
[5] the amount or size of
Wyeth’s sales of diet drugs
or other products; 
[6] Wyeth’s marketing or
promotion of diet drugs to
the extent that Wyeth placed
marketing or promotion
ahead of health or safety
13
concerns; 
[7] any deception or any
d e s t r u c t i o n ,  h i d i n g ,
overwriting, or deliberate
miscoding of documents or
information by Wyeth;
[8] any involvement by
Wyeth in the ghostwriting of
articles;
[9] primary pulmonary
hypertension; 
[10] neurotoxicity; and
[11] any other disease,
illness or condition or
persons suffering from any
other disease, illness or
condition caused by Redux
or Pondimin except for left-
sided valvular heart disease
or pulmonary hypertension
secondary to left-sided
valvular heart disease.
Id. at 1-3 (emphasis added).  So, for
example, the District Court allowed Clark
to prove that relevant warnings were
inadequate or wrong but said Clark “may
not prove or argue that any such failure
was deliberate or intentional.” Id. at 9. 
The District Court vacated its
previous orders, PTO 2625 and PTO 2717,
in light of the more recent and
comprehensive PTO 2828.  And, on June
10, 2003, the District Court issued Pretrial
Order 2883 (“PTO 2883”), which
essentially incorporated the restrictions of
PTO 2828 and enforced them against
plaintiff James in her case in Mississippi
state court.  Appellants timely appealed
PTO 2680 (Smart), PTO 2828 (Clark), and
PTO 2883 (James). 
In October of 2003, while those
appeals were pending, Wyeth returned to
federal court seeking an injunction against
other intermediate opt-outs—including
Linda Eichmiller, also represented by
Fleming & Associates—pursuing claims in
Georgia and Mississippi state courts.
Wyeth argued that counsel from Fleming
& Associates were seeking to introduce
evidence in violation of PTO 2828 even
though they had agreed to comply with
PTO 2828 in other cases pending our
review of the order on appeal. 
Wyeth asserted that counsel sought
to introduce evide nce re gard ing
PPH—specifically, a label for Pondimin
noting that some users had suffered from
PPH and a “black box warning” regarding
PPH that the FDA was considering in
connection with the approval of
Redux—even though plaintiffs were only
claiming they suffered from VHD.  The
District Court entered an injunction similar
to PTO 2828, Pretrial Order 3088 (“PTO
3088”), and explicitly barred plaintiffs
from seeking to introduce the PPH
evidence at trial.   
Plaintiffs timely appealed PTO
3088, and it was consolidated by orders of
this Court with the other appeals from the
District Court’s earlier similar orders.  We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1).
II.
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A distasteful picture of the state
court litigation emerges, displaying what
some might consider the excesses of our
adversary justice system.  Each side sought
to manipulate the settlement agreement in
order to optimize its advantage.  Wyeth’s
counsel resisted admitting, and sought to
exclude, evidence that tended to support
any liability by Wyeth.  Plaintiffs’ counsel,
notably Fleming, repeatedly skirted the
settlement and the District Court’s orders,
plainly seeking to inject prejudicial matter
into the state court cases, including
information about Wyeth’s profits and
sales that was clearly irrelevant to
negligence liabi lity, causation , or
compensatory damages, and that could
only be relevant to obtaining punitive
damages. 
The District Court properly
observed that, were plaintiffs’ counsel
permitted to flout the limits of the
settlement, the 
floodgates will be open and
the prohibition against
punitive damages in the
court approved Settlement
Agreement will be nothing
but a dead letter, with
p o t e n t i a l l y  d i r e
consequences for  th e
settlement as a whole.
PTO 2717.  Faced with this prospect, the
District Court entered the injunctions at
issue in this appeal in order to protect the
settlement against guerrilla warfare from
the opt-out lawyers. 
Appellants now urge us to vacate
the District Court’s orders for three
primary reasons.  First, they argue that the
orders run afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act
and All Writs Act.  Second, they contend
that the Younger abstention doctrine
required the District Court to refrain from
enjoining the state court proceedings.
Finally, appellants argue that the orders
contravene the terms of the settlement
agreement, are unmanageable, and run
afoul of principles of federalism and
comity. 
“The standard of review for the
authority to issue an injunction under the
Anti-Injunction Act and the All-Writs Act
is de novo.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 261 F.3d 355,
363 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted) (hereinafter Prudential I).  When
reviewing a district court’s decision
whether to abstain, “the underlying legal
questions are subject to plenary review,
but the decision to abstain is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.” Grode v. Mut.
Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953,
957 (3d Cir. 1993).  “We review the terms
of an injunction for an abuse of discretion,
underlying questions of law receive de
novo review, and factual determinations
are reviewed for clear error.” Prudential I,
261 F.3d at 363.  Finally, we apply plenary
review to a district court’s construction of
a settlement agreement, but we review a
district court’s interpretation of a
settlement agreement for clear error.
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d
262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re
Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188,
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193 (3d Cir. 2000)).5
A.
The All Writs Act empowers
district courts to “issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
The authority the All Writs Act imparts to
district courts is limited, however, by the
Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits
injunctions “to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. §
2283. 
The two statutes act in concert, and
“[i]f an injunction falls within one of [the
Anti-Injunction Act’s] three exceptions,
the All-Writs Act provides the positive
authority for federal courts to issue
injunctions of state court proceedings.” In
re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133,
143 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Carlough, 10
F.3d at 201 n.9.  The pretrial injunctions at
issue here were not expressly authorized
by statute, so they may be justified only
under the Anti-Injunction Act’s “in aid of
its jurisdiction” or “protect or effectuate its
judgments” exceptions.  These exceptions
“are narrow and are ‘not [to] be enlarged
by loose statutory construction.’”  Chick
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140,
146 (1988) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R.
v. Bhd. Of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S.
281, 287 (1970)). 
The “protect or effectuate its
judgments” exception, known as the
“relitigation exception,” is “founded in the
well-recognized concepts of res judicata
and collateral estoppel.” Id. at 147.  “The
relitigation exception was designed to
permit a federal court to prevent state
litigation of an issue that previously was
presented to and decided by the federal
court.” Id.
We approved an injunction against
state court proceedings under the
relitigation exception in Prudential I.  That
case arose from the class settlement of
claims brought by Prudential policyholders
arising from allegedly fraudulent sales
practices.  Class members were free to
choose settlement for some policies and
not for others.  The notice of settlement
specifically advised each potential class
member, however, that acceptance of the
settlement would prevent any future
assertion of claims that had been or could
have been asserted with respect to any
policy for which the class member chose
to settle.  
Two class members accepted the
settlement for several policies but opted
out for two others.  They then brought a
Florida state action to recover on the two
excluded policies, basing their claims in
part on facts that also supported claims
arising from settled policies.  In effect,
5 We discussed at length the
distinction between contract construction
and contract interpretation in Ram Constr.
Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049,
1053 (3d Cir. 1984).
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plaintiffs sought to undermine the
settlement’s claim preclusion order. 
The District Court enjoined the
plaintiffs in the Florida action from “using
evidence common to the purchase and
sale” of the settled policies. 261 F.3d at
368.  The injunction effectuated the
settlement agreement’s bar against new
claims based on “facts and circumstances
underlying” the claims that had been
settled and released. Id. at 361.  The order
was designed to prevent new claims that
were based in whole or part on settled and
released claims.  The straightforward
injunction language mirrored the familiar
rules of claim and issue preclusion that are
often applied by courts. 
This case differs from Prudential I,
because under the settlement agreement
opt-outs’ settled claims do not go to
judgment; rather, their claims proceed in
state courts with limits on the type of
damages they can seek.  Thus the District
Court had to enforce a damages
preclusion, not a claim preclusion.  This
was obviously more complicated because
permitted claims could give rise to both
allowable compensatory damages and
forbidden punitive damages.
Consequently, the concepts of issue
and claim preclusion are not entirely
apposite here.  We need not determine
whether the District Court had the
authority to effectuate the settlement
agreement’s punitive damages provision
under the Anti-Injunction Act’s relitigation
exception, however, because in any case it
had the power to issue the injunction under
the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception.
“[A]n injunction is necessary in aid
of a court’s jurisdiction only if ‘some
federal injunctive relief may be necessary
to prevent a state court from so interfering
with a federal court’s consideration or
disposition of a case as to seriously impair
the federal court’s flexibility and authority
to decide that case.’” Diet Drugs I, 282
F.3d at 234 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R.,
398 U.S. at 294).  One instance where we
have determined that a federal court may
enjoin state court proceedings to protect its
jurisdiction is when a federal court is
“entertaining complex litigation, especially
when it involves a substantial class of
persons from multiple states, or represents
a consolidation of cases from multiple
districts.” Id. at 235 (citing Carlough, 10
F.3d at 202-04); see also In re Gen.
Motors, 134 F.3d at 145.
Here, as in Prudential II, the
District Court retained “continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction . . . to administer,
supervise, interpret and enforce the
Settlement in accordance with its terms.”
Joint App. 398.  In Prudential II, we
explained: 
The  set t lem ent he re
represented a herculean
effort to provide a fair and
consistent framework for the
resolution of millions of
claims.  The comprehensive
procedures implemented for
this purpose were integral to
this effort.  Permitting
continued litigation of these
17
claims would “unsettle”
what had been thought to be
settled, and would disrupt
c a r e fu l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d
procedures for individual
d i s p u t e  r e s o l u t i o n .
Allowing comprehensive
s e t t l e m e n t s  t o  b e
undermined in this way
would undeniably deter
similar settlements in the
future.
314 F.3d at 105; see also United States v.
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d
1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that
the “in aid of its jurisdiction” exception
applies when district court retains
jurisdiction over a settlement agreement).
As we have described above, the
punitive damages release is a central pillar
of the settlement agreement.  Allowing
state court actions to run afoul of that
provision would fatally subvert it and
render the agreement (and the Court’s
jurisdiction) nugatory.  The District
Court’s ability to give effect to that
provision is necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction. 
Yet “the fact that an injunction may
issue under the Anti-Injunction Act does
not mean that it must issue.” Chick Kam
Choo, 486 U.S. at 151.  Specifically,
principles of comity, federalism, and
equity always restrain federal courts’
ability to enjoin state court proceedings.
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243
(1972); 17 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
4226, at 551 (2d ed. 1995).6 
B.
Any court determining whether to
issue an injunction must consider several
factors that guide and constrain its
6 Appellants raise the issue of
Younger abstention, the prudential
corollary to the Anti-Injunction Act’s
statutory circumscription of federal courts’
ability to enjoin state court proceedings,
see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
but we need address it only briefly.
Although Younger’s application to civil
proceedings between two private parties
remains relatively unclear, a consistent
prerequisite is that “an important state
interest is implicated.” See Anthony v.
Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).
 We discern nothing about the state civil
proceedings at issue here—personal injury
suits sounding largely in state tort
law—that can fairly be thought to
implicate “important state interests.”  The
instances where the Supreme Court and
this Court have applied Younger to state
civil proceedings—such as state contempt
proceedings, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); judicial proceedings enforcing
state court orders, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987); and child support
contempt proceedings, Anthony, 316 F.3d
at 421—involved proceedings qualitatively
different from those at issue here. This
much was inherent in our decision in
Prudential I and Prudential II, where we
upheld orders enjoining state tort
proceedings.
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equitable authority. See Temple Univ. v.
White, 941 F.2d 201, 214-15 (3d Cir.
1991); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476,
482 (3d Cir. 2001).  Of primary
importance, a party seeking an injunction
must show that there is some legal
transgression that an injunction would
remedy.7
In addition, any injunction a court
issues must be commensurate with the
wrong it is crafted to remedy—it is a
“settled rule that in federal equity cases
‘the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy.’” Rizzo, 423 U.S. at
378 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 , 16
(1971)); see also Forschner Group, Inc. v.
Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“It is well-settled that the
essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power to grant relief no broader than
necessary to cure the effects of the harm
caused by the violation”).  As this Court
stated in Temple Univ. v. White, 
While the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to
effect a remedy is broad, the
relief which a district court
may grant can be no broader
than that necessary to
correc t the vio lat ion.
Indeed, a federal court is
required to tailor the scope
of its remedy in order to fit
the nature of the violation
which it has found. 
941 F.2d at 215.  The proper tailoring of
injunctive relief is especially important
when principles of federalism are
involved. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371
(“[A]ppropriate consideration must be
given to principles of federalism in
determining the availability and scope of
equitable relief.”).  In other words,
“federal courts should always seek to
minimize interference with legitimate state
activities in tailoring remedies.” Stone v.
City and County of San Francisco, 968
F.2d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Here, the putative transgression that
Wyeth sought to remedy through an
injunction was appellants’ violation of the
settlement agreement.  Thus, two
interrelated considerations guide our
review: (1) the proper construction of the
settlement agreement’s punitive damages
provision; and (2) the scope of the District
Court’s injunctions.  In other words, we
must construe the settlement agreement
and then determine the extent to which the
District Court’s injunctions prohibited
actions that contravened the terms of the
settlement. An over-inclusive injunction
would run afoul of well-established
principles of equity and federalism.  
1. 
The decision of a potential
settlement class member to remain with
the class or to opt out entirely at the
threshold is a fateful one.  The average
class member has had no hand in
7 Put differently, a party seeking a
permanent injunction must “succeed on
the merits.” See, e.g., Temple Univ., 941
F.2d at 215.
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negotiating the terms of the settlement.  As
demonstrated in Prudential I, the
settlement’s preclusive effect may be
broad and strict.  By waiving an initial opt-
out, the class member surrenders what may
be valuable rights, in return for
countervailing benefits.  In this case,
important information for these potential
class members included the availability,
benefits, and disadvantage of the
intermediate opt-out right.
This opt-out choice raises a
significant issue of fairness.  As in
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., the
individual class members here have claims
“that frequently receive huge awards in the
tort system.” 83 F.3d at 633.  They can
hardly knowingly waive some of their tort
rights without a clear notice of what they
are waiving.  They may be entirely
dependent on the class notice for this
information.  That is why we paid careful
attention to the language of the class
notice, which detailed the extent of the
released claims, in upholding the
injunction that enforced the preclusive
provisions of the settlement in Prudential
I. 261 F.3d at 366-67.
It follows that the preclusion
language in the Diet Drugs class notice
and settlement agreement must, in order to
avoid due process concerns, be strictly
construed against those who seek to
restrict class members from pursuing
individual claims. Cf. United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)
(“Statutes should be construed to avoid
constitutional questions . . . .”).  Here, the
following language in the class notice
informed putative class members of the
consequences if they signed onto the class
and exercised intermediate opt-out rights:
If you exercise the
Intermediate Opt-Out right,
you give up the right to
receive further benefits
unde r  the  S et t lement
Agreement, but you may
choose to pursue in court
any legal claims you may
have again st [W yeth]
relating to your use of
Pondimin and/or Redux.
However, it is important to
understand that if you
exercise the Intermediate
Opt-Out right, and choose
to bring a lawsuit against
[Wyeth], your lawsuit will
be subject to certain
restrictions including the
following:
! If you exercise your
Intermediate Opt-Out right
and choose to bring a
lawsuit against [Wyeth], you
may not seek punitive or
multiple damages.
! If you exercise your
Intermediate Opt-Out right
and choose to bring a
lawsuit against [Wyeth], you
may only assert a legal
claim based on the heart
valve condition of the
r e l e v a n t  D i e t  D r u g
Recipient that was [properly
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d i a g n o s e d  w i t h i n  a
prescribed time period].
! If you exercise your
Intermediate Opt-Out right
and choose to bring a
lawsuit against [Wyeth],
both you and [Wyeth] will
be subject to certain
additional restrictions that
are  desc ribed in  the
Settlement Agreement.  In
order for [Wyeth] to be
subject to these restrictions,
such as waiver of any statute
of limitations defense, you
must bring your lawsuit, if
you choose to do so, within
one (1) year from the date
on which you exercise your
Intermediate Opt-Out right.
Wyeth Br., Ex. A at 12.  The
corresponding preclusive language in the
se t t l e m e n t  a g r e emen t  r ega rd in g
intermediate opt-outs appeared in three
portions:
[1] [An intermediate opt-
out] may pursue all of his or
her Settled Claims (except
for those claims set forth in
subparagraphs (e) and (g) of
Section I.538), against
[Wyeth and other released
parties], but may only assert
a claim . . . based on the
heart valve of the relevant
Diet Drug Recipient which
w as di ag no se d b y a
Qualified Physician as FDA
P o s i t i v e  b y  a n
Echocardiogram . . . . 
[2] With respect to [any
intermediate opt-out] who
initiates a lawsuit against
any of the Released Parties
within one year from the
d a t e  o n  w h i c h  t h e
Intermediate Opt-Out right
is exercised, [Wyeth] shall
not assert any defense based
on any statute of limitations
or repose, the doctrine of
laches, any other defense
predicated on the failure to
timely pursue the claim, any
defense based on “splitting”
8Subparagraphs (e) and (g) of
Section I.53 include, as part of the
definition of “Settled Claims,” all claims
for damages or any other remedies for:
e. consumer fraud, refunds,
unfair business practices,
deceptive trade practices,
Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices (“UDAP”),
and other similar claims
whether arising under
statute, regulation, or
judicial decision;
. . . 
g. medical screening and
monitoring, injunctive and
declaratory relief[.]
Joint App. 572.
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a cause of action, any
defense based on any release
signed pursuant to the
Set t lement Agreement,
and/or any other defense
based on the existence of the
Sett lement Agreement,
except to  the extent
p r o v i d e d  h e r e i n .
[Intermediate opt-outs] may
n o t  s e e k  p u n i t i v e ,
exemplary, or any multiple
damages against [Wyeth or
other released parties] . . . . 
[3] [Intermediate opt-outs]
may not use any previous
verdicts  or judgments
against [Wyeth], or factual
findings necessary to such
verdicts or judgments, for
purposes of establishing
claims or facts in order to
obtain a verdict or judgment
against [Wyeth] under the
doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel or other
doctrines of claim or issue
preclusion.  Nor may
[intermediate opt-outs] seek
to introduce into evidence
against [Wyeth], for any
purpose, such a verdict,
judgment, or factual finding.
Lawsu its in i t ia ted  by
[intermediate opt-outs] shall
be subject to the provisions
of Section VII.F.3.9  
Joint App. 615-17.
Three restrictions emerge.  First, the
potential class members were told that
intermediate opt-outs will be allowed to
“pursue all . . . Settled Claims” for timely
diagnosed VHD, except for those
pertaining to consumer fraud or business
9 Section VIII.F.3 provides:
The Parties to the
Settlement . . . shall not seek
to introduce and/or offer the
terms of the Settlement
Agreement, any statement,
transaction or proceeding in
connectio n with the
negotiation, execution or
implementation of this
Settlement Agreement, any
statements in the notice
documents appended to this
Settlement Agreement,
stipulations, agreements, or
admissions made or entered
into in connection with the
fairness hearing or any
finding of fact or conclusion
of law made by the Trial
Court, or otherwise rely on
the terms of this Settlement,
in any judicial proceeding,
except insofar as it is
necessary to enforce the
terms of the Settlement.
Joint App. 704.
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loss.  Specifically included are claims for
such open-textured injuries as mental
anguish, pain and suffering, and loss of
consortium.  Second, Wyeth agreed not to
assert any defenses based on class
members’ failure to assert a timely claim
and class members “may not seek punitive,
exemplary, or any multiple damages.”
Finally, the provision addressed certain
evidentiary restrictions: (1) intermediate
opt-outs may not “seek to introduce into
evidence” earlier verdicts or judgments
against Wyeth, or the factual findings
underlying them; and (2) neither party can
offer evidence regarding the settlement
agreement, including evidence regarding
its negotiation or implementation.
The plain language is telling.  The
i n t e r m e d i a t e  o p t - o u t  p r o v i s i o n
comprehensively promised that claims for
a wide variety of losses can be sought, so
long as they are for FDA-positive VHD.
There is no limitation on VHD-related
claims or causes of action.  Moreover,
there is no expression that opportunities to
recover for mental anguish, pain, or loss of
consortium will be impeded or hampered.
If the drafters were concerned these type
of recoveries might become vehicles for
sub rosa punitive awards, they might have
limited them; they did not.
Instead, the authors of the
settlement specifically excluded only
“punitive, multiple, and exemplary
damages” from the laundry list of
allowable recoveries.  This reinforces the
natural conclusion that claims for VHD
were not restricted by the settlement, so
long as forms of damages other than those
expressly forbidden were sought.
S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  e v i d e n t i a r y
restrictions are explicitly addressed in the
relevant provision of the agreement.  The
agreement forbids prior adverse findings
or judgments against Wyeth from being
placed in evidence for any purpose, as well
as a wide range of evidence regarding the
settlement agreement itself.  This implies
to the reader of the agreement that the
drafters knew how to identify evidence
restrictions when they wished to do so.
There is no restriction, however, placed on
the use of evidence simply because it
would be relevant in supporting punitive
damages.  One deduces from the absence
of such an evidentiary restriction that the
agreement meant only to block the
specified type of damages award and not
types of evidence that are relevant to
permissible awards but might also be
relevant to punitive damages.
Appellees seek to rebut this
language by referring to colloquy during
the fairness proceedings that they claim
further refines the meaning of the punitive
damages preclusion.  At an October 2002
status hearing, one negotiator stated his
understanding that
the essence of this bargain
was that there would be no
punitive damages in these
downstream opt out cases
and that does not simply
mean no punitive damages.
W h a t  [ W y e t h ]  w a s
bargaining for, clearly, they
were saying . . . we were
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willing to pay for what
juries determine were
caused by our diet drugs
without reference to some
additional element that is
awarded by reference to
fault evidence.
Joint App. 2149.  This might be pertinent
in construing the agreement as between
parties who actually participated in the
negotiations. See, e.g., Bohler-Uddeholm
Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d
79, 114 (3d Cir. 2001).  But due process
considerations counsel against binding
absent potential class members to
understandings that were not made express
in the class notice or settlement agreement.
And we are particularly wary of binding
class members through statements made
after the settlement was finalized and after
they had to choose whether to opt out.
Appellees urge that our decision in
Prudential I disposes of appellants’ claims
because they read that decision to hold that
“when class members settle and release
some of their claims—but preserve other
claims from the settlement—that release
bars the plaintiffs from offering evidence
relating to the released claims in any
subsequent trial of the preserved claims.”
Wyeth Br. 36.  But we think that the
settlement preclusion in Prudential I is
different from this one, and different in a
meaningful way.
The class notice in Prudential I
informed class members that, in return for
accepting settlements on some policy
claims, they would release the defendants
from any and all causes of
actions, claims, damages,
e q u i t a b l e,  l ega l  a n d
a d m in i s tr a t iv e  r e l i ef ,
interest, demands or rights,
of any kind or nature
whatsoever . . . that have
been, could have been, may
be or could be alleged or
asserted now or in the future
. . . on the basis of,
connected with, arising out
of, or related to, in whole or
in part, the Released
Transactions [i.e., settled
policies under the settlement
agreement].
261 F.3d at 367 (emphasis omitted).  In
other words, any cause of action or claim
that was in any way related to a settled
policy—even a claim that “could have
been” raised on the basis of such a
policy—was barred.  This release language
was indeed, as the class notice explicitly
warned potential class members, “intended
to be very broad.” Id. at 366.  And the
District Court’s injunction in that case
tracked the language of the class notice,
forbidding class members from bringing a
lawsuit “based on or related to the facts
and circumstances underlying the claims
and causes of action” that were settled in
the class action. Id. at 361.  To block new
claims “based on facts” underlying other
settled claims is simply to effectuate the
class notice language releasing claims that
“could have been brought” based on the
settled transactions.  In other words, the
release language in the Prudential
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settlement was typical general release
language that prevents new causes of
action from overlapping with settled
causes of action with a “common nucleus
of operative facts.” Id. at 367.
Contrast the language in the Diet
Drugs release.  The Diet Drugs release is
not structured as a broad claims
preclusion, but as a bar only to the
magnitude and type of relief.  The only
claims-based limitations are that (1) the
claims must be based on a timely
diagnosed VHD injury, and (2) the claim
may not be for consumer or business
losses.  VH D-based claims for
compensation, including for pain, anguish,
and loss of consortium, are not precluded
or limited in any way.  Indeed, the
settlement agreement specifically contains
Wyeth’s renunciation of any defense based
on “‘splitting’ a cause of action.”  What is
limited is the type and extent of damages
for such VHD-claims.
If we were to accept Wyeth’s
invitation to read this damages limitation
as if it were a broad Prudential-type
release of all claims that could be the basis
for a punitive damages award, we would
face an anomaly. Since the predicate to
any punitive or multiple damages award is
a finding of tortious liability, Wyeth’s
logic would foreclose opt-out plaintiffs
from proving liability at all.  That
interpretation would make the settlement
agreement internally contradictory.
Of course, Wyeth does not press so
absurd a contention.  But, in effect, Wyeth
wants us to read this punitive damages
limitation as if it were a limit on the
manner in which opt-out plaintiffs can
pursue their claims for compensation.
Under this view, a plaintiff may show
unreasonable behavior to recover
compensation for negligence, unless the
behavior was really unreasonable (so that
it might support punitive damages).  Put
another way, Wyeth urges that very strong
evidence of fault must be diluted so that it
would not arouse the jury to award
punitive damages, if punitive damages
could be awarded—which they cannot be.
In the absence of an explicit description of
this novel type of restriction in the
settlement agreement, we decline to
construe the agreement to imply an
evidence-di lution requirement for
compensation claims that are clearly
preserved for the opt-out plaintiffs. 
2. 
All of this is not to say that the
District Court was powerless to restrain
opt-out plaintiffs from evading the
prohibition against exemplary damages.
Even under a strict construction of the
settlement agreement, the District Court
was entitled to prevent circumvention of
the damages limitation.  The District Court
acted consistently with the settlement
agreement, for example, when it enjoined
the introduction of certain types of
e v i d e nce  re leva nt  on ly  to  the
impermissible purpose of obtaining
punitive damages.  Appellants conceded
this at oral argument. Tr. 9.  So, as
appellants acknowledged, the District
Court correctly banned evidence relating
to Wyeth’s size, profits, and sales figures,
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which is not probative of liability,
causation, or compensation. Id. at 10, 13.
But PTO 2828 swept far more
broadly, prohibiting Clark from offering
evidence that was relevant—indeed, highly
probative—on issues of negligence and
failure to warn.10  The District Court
reasoned that such evidence, if suggestive
as well of intentional misconduct, fell
within the punitive damages bar because it
could support a punitive verdict or because
it could inflame the state jury.  The test
that the District Court seemed to employ
was to place “off-limits” evidence that was
not “necessary” to prove a claim to
compensation. PTO 2828, at 8.  Excluded
under this approach were pieces of
evidence that “suggest malfeasance on the
part of the company that goes beyond mere
negligence,” id. at 27, or that “connotes
more than negligence.” Id. at 32.
Intentional or reckless behavior
may be highly probative of elements of
negligence or defective design cases.  The
failure to report adverse actions to the
F D A — w h e t h e r  a c c i d e n t a l  o r
intentional—would be probative of a
failure to warn.  And intentional or
reckless behavior is often relevant to
showing conduct below the reasonable
standard of care necessary to make out a
case of negligence.11
10 We center our discussion on PTO
2828 because it was the most
comprehensive of the District Court’s
orders and appears to have established a
baseline set of guidelines for all
intermediate opt-outs litigating their
claims in state courts, regardless of
whether they were parties to PTO 2828.
Counsel for Eichmiller et al., for example,
agreed to comply with PTO 2828 even
though it did not specifically bind them.
11 Certain categories of intentional
conduct—specifically, intentionally
tortious conduct—do not support a claim
of negligence in certain jurisdictions.
Compare Dairy Road Partners v. Island
Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 114-15 (Haw.
2000), Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Miller, 765
A.2d 587, 601 (Md. 2001), and Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 641 (1930)
with Landry v. Leonard N. East Ins. Co.,
720 A.2d 907, 910 (Me. 1998), Am. Nat’l
Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 607 A.2d 418, 423
(Conn. 1992), and Walters v. Blackshear,
591 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Mass. 1992).  The
distinguishing factor between intentionally
and negligently tortious conduct is that an
intentional tortfeasor intends to bring
about the harm that results from his
actions. See Schuss, 607 A.2d at 423.
Thus even in those jurisdictions where
negligence and intentional torts are
mutually exclusive, intentional conduct
may be relevant to negligence so long as it
does not involve intent to bring about the
harmful result. See Landry, 720 A.2d at
910; Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of
Torts § 16.9 n.2 (“An intentional act may
be negligent.”) (citing Dartez v. Gadbois,
541 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976));
see also Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d
84, 89-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(“We see no reason why an intentional act
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A few examples suffice to illustrate the problem.  The District Court correctly
recognized that the use and content of a
“black box” on the drug warning label
“goes to the issue of failure to warn.” Id. at
8.  Accordingly, it authorized Clark to seek
to prove that warnings were “inadequate or
wrong and that certain relevant
information was not reported or not
reported on a timely basis to the FDA.” Id.
at 9.  But the Court held that to avoid
“implicat[ing]” punitive damages, Clark
could not prove that any such failure was
intentional.  As a consequence, the District
Court struck deposition testimony from
Wyeth’s Associate Director of Safety
Surveillance specifically admitting that
valvular heart disease reactions to the
drugs were not reported to the FDA. Id. at
33.  The District Court also banned
testimony from other witnesses that they
fought strenuously against any “black box”
warning. PTO 2828, at 31.  This evidence
certainly tended to prove that the
defendant “knows or should know of a
potential risk of harm presented by a
product but markets it without adequately
warning of the danger,” which is the
definition of a “marketing defect” under
Texas tort law. See Sims v. Washex Mach.
Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995); see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1318-20 & n.8
(5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Mississippi law).
But under PTO 2828, this evidence was
placed out of bounds.
Similarly, the District Court placed
off-limits any evidence that mentioned
medical side-effects other than VHD
that produces unintended consequences
cannot be a foundation for a negligence
action.”); see also 57A Am. Jur. 2d
Negligence § 30 (2004).  As one major
treatise explains: 
[I]ntentional conduct and
even intentional risk-taking
i s  a n a l yz e d  u n d e r
negligence rules unless the
defendant has a purpose to
invade the plaintiff’s
interests or a certainty that
such an invasion will occur.
. . .  The defendant who
intentionally takes a risk
may or may not be
negligent; negligence will
depend upon the seriousness
of the risk and the reasons
for taking it. 
. . . .
In spite of the fact that it is
conduct and risk, not mental
state that determines
negligence, the defendant’s
state of mind is not
necessarily irrelevant in a
negligence case.  The
defendant’s knowledge of
facts that make a given act
risky (as distinct from his
attitude) is frequently
important on the negligence
issue.
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 116
(2001).
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itself.12  This evidence was not offered to
support claims for these side-effects, since
plaintiffs did not suffer from them.
Rather, they were offered for other
purposes, such as to prove duty to warn.
Evidence of the totality of the risks of
injury may be admissible under state law
to show the scope of the duty to warn,
even if the individual plaintiff has not
sustained all the injuries in question. See
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456,
468 (5th Cir. 1985).  Nevertheless, the
District Court ruled out testimony about
delays in changing warning labels on
Pondimin if the warnings concerned PPH.
The Court justified this ruling on the
ground that plaintiffs did not have these
side-effects, so that this evidence would
“have the effect of unfairly arousing the
jury against Wyeth.” PTO 2828, at 7.  
T he  Di s t r ic t  Cour t  a l s o
categorically prohibited plaintiffs from
offering evidence of “Wyeth’s marketing
or promotion of diet drugs to the extent
that Wyeth placed marketing or promotion
ahead of health or safety concerns.” Id. at
6.  The Court took this step on the grounds
that “such evidence and argument can
have no other purpose than to obtain
punitive damages.” Id. at 20.  Evidence
tending simply to show that Wyeth wanted
to successfully market the diet drugs and
make a profit selling them would not be
relevant to show, for example, that Wyeth
acted negligently.  But excessive concern
with the image and marketing of the diet
drugs at the expense of making efforts
toward determining whether they were
safe could be probative as to whether
Wyeth breached a duty of care towards the
plaintiffs. 
In effect, the District Court trimmed
evidence that was probative, but that it
viewed as unnecessary and so inculpatory
that it might inflame the jury to award
damages that would punish Wyeth instead
of simply compensating the plaintiffs.  The
District Judge effectively adopted the role
of a trial judge balancing probative value
against unfair prejudice. Cf. Fed. R. Evid.
403.  By doing that, he moved beyond
mere enforcement of the damages
restriction, and affected plaintiff’s right to
try her permissible liability case.  
A trial is more than a matter of
presenting a series of individual fact
questions in arid fashion to a jury.  The
jury properly weighs fact questions in the
context of a coherent picture of the way
the world works.  A verdict is not merely
the sum of individual findings, but the
assembly of those findings into that picture
of the truth.  As the Supreme Court
instructed in Old Chief v. United States,
evidence “has force beyond any linear
scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces
come together a na rrative gains
12 This ruling was not based on
claim preclusion.  Intermediate opt-outs
were limited to recovery for VHD but
were not barred from recovery for PPH, a
side-effect that is distinct from VHD. See
Joint App. 572-73, 616; PTO 1415, at 70;
In re Diet Drugs, No. 99-20953,
Memorandum and Pretrial Order No.
3065, at 5 (E.D. Pa. filed October 10,
2003).
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momentum, with power not only to
support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the
inferences, whatever they may be,
necessary to reach an honest verdict.” 519
U.S. 172, 187 (1997).  Unduly sterilizing a
party’s trial presentation can unfairly
hamper her ability to shape a compelling
and coherent exposition of the facts. 
Of course, at trial this process of
evidentiary balancing is nuanced and
contextual. For that reason, “excluding
evidence under Fed R. Evid. 403 at the
pretrial stage is an extreme measure.”
Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926
F.2d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 1991).  In In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, we
explained: 
[A] court cannot fairly
ascertain  the po tential
relevance of evidence for
Rule 403 purposes until it
has a full record relevant to
the putatively objectionable
evidence. We believe that
Rule 403 is a trial- oriented
rule. Precipitous Rule 403
determinations, before the
challenging party has had an
opportunity to develop the
record, are therefore unfair
and improper.
916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal
citation omitted).  In short, the District
Court’s broad order prematurely struck the
balance between probativeness and
prejudice, and did so for trial proceedings
yet to occur in another court system before
a different judge. 
Appellees argue that Clark has no
cause to complain about losing access to
some evidence relevant to liability because
she was offered, and declined, Wyeth’s
stipulation not to contest the element of
breach of duty. Wyeth Br. 46.  Notably,
Wyeth did not offer to concede negligence
or defective warning before the jury.  It
proposed, instead, a stipulation, in the
form of a conditional double negative, that
would present two specific interrogatories
to the jury—cause in fact and damages.
Joint App. 3371-72. 
This  pars imonious—indeed ,
illusory—offer  was understandably
rejected by Clark’s counsel.  As State
District Judge Powell found, it simply
misconceived Texas tort law, and would
have created confusion for the jury.  But
beyond that, restricting plaintiff to a sterile
concession and the right to litigate two
particularized questions would seriously
disadvantage her at trial (as skilled counsel
for Wyeth surely recognized).  Jurors
might well wonder at the fairness of
determining causation and damages in a
vacuum devoid of any suggestion of
liability or negligence.  Intermediate opt
out plaintiffs never agreed to relinquish
their right to try their allowed claims
effectively in state court.
Moreover, removing critical issues
of fact from the jury without an adequate
explanation runs the risk of distorting jury
deliberations.  The absence of proof that
would normally be expected can cause the
jury to draw unwarranted inferences.
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“[T]here lies the need for evidence in all
its particularity to satisfy the jurors’
expectations about what proper proof
should be.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188.
For this reason, unless a stipulation
adequately concedes an element of proof,
it can prejudice the party carrying the
burden of proof.  In this case, the proposed
concession by Wyeth would, as Judge
Powell saw, “raise a substantial possibility
that one or more jurors would be
influenced by the lack of evidence and the
lack of explanation.” Joint App. 1290.
Insofar as the injunctions barred the
use of evidence that was relevant to
genuine issues in the state trial—apart
from punitive, multiple, or exemplary
damages—they placed restrictions on opt-
out plaintiffs that went beyond the fair
terms of the settlement agreement.  
3.
Finally, we note that injunctions
must be enforceable, workable, and
capable of court supervision. See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973)
(“[E]quitable remedies are a special blend
of what is necessary, what is fair, and what
is workable.”); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161-66 (1948)
(vacating injunction that implicated the
“judiciary heavily in the details of business
management” in order for supervision “to
be effective”); Rutland Marble Co. v.
Ripley, 77 U.S. 339, 358-59 (1870) (“It is
manifest that the court cannot superintend
the execution of such a decree. It is quite
impracticable.”); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 943 cmt. a (“In determining the
appropriateness of injunctive relief, the
court must give consideration to the
practicality of drafting and enforcing the
order or judgment. If drafting and
enforcing are found to be impracticable,
the injunction should not be granted.”).
The District Court’s orders raise practical
and institutional concerns in this regard.
PTO 2828, as we have seen, is not
limited to protecting the core of the
settlement’s damages limitation by
forbidding plaintiffs from seeking such
damages in their pleadings or presenting
evidence relevant only to such damages.
Rather, the order enforces a series of
prophylactic prohibitions that affect
plaintiffs’ ability to obtain permissible
compensatory damages.  As written, PTO
2828—which is enforceable, of course, by
the sanction of contempt—would make it
very difficult for plaintiff to try the case
that is preserved to her under the
settlement agreement.  
Numerous exhibits and portions of
testimony are excluded definitively,
regardless of the purpose for which they
are offered.  By way of example, the
District Court nixed deposition testimony
about efforts by Wyeth employees to avoid
a “black box” warning.  It is not clear what
recourse a plaintiff would have if, during
the course of trial, a Wyeth employee were
to assert that Wyeth was always
scrupulous and forthcoming on warning
issues.  By its terms, the order would
appear to forbid plaintiff from offering the
deposition testimony for purposes of
rebuttal or impeachment.  Nor, on the face
of the order, would plaintiff be justified in
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introducing evidence of failure to warn
regarding PPH on the ground that it
negates the trial testimony that Wyeth is
always forthcoming.  Normally, a trial
judge might well conclude such testimony
opened the door for previously out-of-
bounds evidence.  PTO 2828 does not vest
the state judge with that discretion.
Presumably, the parties—and the state
court—would have to contact the District
Court and seek a modification of PTO
2828.
Even more awkward is the broadly
framed prohibition against offering
evidence “related directly or indirectly” to
such topics as wanton or similar conduct
by Wyeth, or Wyeth’s marketing of diet
drugs “to the extent Wyeth placed
marketing or promotion ahead of health or
safety concerns.”  Almost any proof
related to negligence can be regarded as
“related indirectly” to wanton conduct.
Hypothetically, imagine that Clark calls a
witness who will testify that Wyeth
officials were made aware of VHD
dangers and reached a decision that no
warning should be published.  PTO 2828
could be read to preclude this evidence
because it is “indirectly related” to
“wanton or similar conduct.”  Of course,
the evidence is also highly probative of
negligence.  
Another hypothetical: Suppose
Wyeth calls a witness who testifies that
decisions about warnings are made only
after careful evaluation of scientific
evidence.  Would PTO 2828 allow Clark’s
attorney to cross-examine on (still
hypothetical) instances where marketing
considerations were discussed in meetings
about warnings?
Again, in the usual case counsel
faced with such a question would ask the
trial judge for guidance either by way of
motion or sidebar.  But PTO 2828 would
make those questions fodder for the
District Court, without a full appreciation
of the flow of the testimony.  Counsel
might have to seek, for example,
telephonic sidebars with the District Court.
The order creates a highly intrusive and
unworkable regulatory scheme. 
Moreover, we emphasize, the rules
imposed by PTO 2828 are not merely
enforceable by the usual mechanism of the
trial court’s sustaining objections or,
perhaps, granting a mistrial.  Here, a
viola t ion o f t he  ru le—a wrong
guess—could result in a punitive sanction.
There will be strong pressure on counsel to
steer well clear of the line and possibly
forego offering admissible evidence that
Clark would normally expect to get before
the jury.
This order is even more problematic
insofar as it bans counsel from making
argument “to the court” regarding these
topics.  Read literally (as counsel must),
this would prevent Clark from even
arguing to the state judge, outside the
presence of the jury, that certain evidence
falls within or outside the scope of PTO
2828.  We do not think the District Court
actually meant to preclude such argument.
Indeed, it is hard to see what purpose
would be served—and easy to see the
problems that would arise—in restraining
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counsel from making arguments in state
court.  The point is that the District Court’s
understandable effort to lock the door
against impermissible attempts to obtain
exemplary damages led to an order that
seriously interferes with Clark’s rights to
try her case.
Implicit in our discussion as well is
the fact that PTO 2828 disrupts the state
court’s ability to manage its own judicial
process.  As the previous illustrations
suggest, PTO 2828 would remove from the
state judge a whole panoply of decisions
that he or she would normally be
authorized—indeed obliged—to make.
But the process the order leaves is unclear.
Some of the exclusions in the order are left
to be applied by the state judge.  Others are
not.  It is not clear, for example, whether
the state judge would determine whether
evidence is “related indirectly” to
forbidden topics.
As we have held, the District Court
had the unquestioned right to effectuate
the restraints of the settlement through an
order limiting opt-out plaintiffs’ conduct in
ancillary state proceedings.  But we
believe that that power must be exercised
in a manner that minimizes entanglement
in the state judge’s ability to supervise
judicial proceedings in his own courtroom.
Similarly, the order should be fashioned in
a manner that presumes that the state judge
is capable and willing to enforce that
settlement without close and intrusive
supervision by the District Court.  
III.
The settlement approved and
supervised by the District Court in this
case is a landmark effort to reconcile the
rights of millions of individual plaintiffs
with the efficiencies and fairness of a
class-based settlement.  Critical to this
effort was the allowance of downstream
opt-outs, so that potential class members
were not faced with an all-or-nothing
decision at the threshold.  To make this
allowance meaningful, the settlement had
to protect Wyeth against its largest fear,
potentially ruinous punitive damage
awards.  At the same time, it had to allow
intermediate opt-out plaintiffs to have a
fair chance to litigate their claims and
obtain those damages that were expressly
preserved.
The District Court had, and still
has, the power to effectuate and protect the
terms of this bargain.  But in doing so, the
Court must be mindful of two limiting
considerations: (1) opt-outs must be able
to fairly litigate the claims preserved to
them under the agreement, and (2)
intrusion into state court proceedings
should be minimized. 
Accordingly, the District Court
erred in imposing the evidentiary
restrictions of PTO 2828 because those
restrictions were overbroad and impinged
on plaintiffs’ rights under the settlement,
and they unduly entangled the Court in the
management of separate state court
proceedings.  PTO 2828’s pre-trial
evidentiary restrictions survive these
limiting principles only insofar as they
prohibit opt-outs from offering evidence
that is relevant exclusively to forbidden
damages. See PTO 2828, ¶¶ (3)(a)-(b).  As
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appellants themselves concede, an
injunction to that effect is entirely
permissible. 
Specifically, the following portions
of PTO 2828 must be vacated: (i) the
categorical evidentiary restrictions in
Subsections (2)(b)-(c) and Subsections
(3)(c)-(h), insofar as they preclude
plaintiffs from introducing evidence
relevant to proving their VHD claims in
state court; and (ii) the limitations on
exhibits and deposition testimony in
Section (4), insofar as they preclude
plaintiffs from introducing evidence
relevant to proving their claims in state
court. PTO 2828 is consistent with this
opinion insofar as it prohibits plaintiffs
from “introducing any evidence” relevant
exclusively to “punitive, exemplary or
multiple damages, however described,”
which specifically includes evidence of
“(a) Wyeth’s profits, size or financial
condition”; and “(b) the amount or size of
Wyeth’s sales of diet drugs or other
products.” 
PTO 2828 also runs afoul of this
opinion insofar as it prohibits the parties
from “making any statement or argument
to the court.” But the order is consistent
with this opinion insofar as it prohibits the
parties from “making any statement or
argument to the  . . . jury related directly”
to evidence relevant only to punitive
damages.13
We note that although we have
limited the District Court’s ability to
prohibit the parties from offering certain
evidence in their state court trials, the state
courts are presumably mindful of the
obligation to honor the settlement
agreement, and to ensure that the parties
do not evade it. That will undoubtedly
impel the state courts during trial to
exclude evidence when its prejudicial
effect (namely its tendency to inflame the
jury and improperly inflate compensatory
damages) outweighs its probative value.
We are confident, particularly in light of
the previous state court orders in the
record, that the state courts can and will
capably manage this task. 
In addition, our opinion leaves the
District Court free to consider other
measures, aside from imposing evidentiary
restraints, that will effectuate the
limitations of the settlement agreement.
The District Court might consider, for
example, ordering language to be included
in a stipulation or proposed jury instruction
that would make it clear to the jury that
exemplary damages may not be awarded.
Or, the Court could direct the parties to
agree to a bifurcated trial—where damages
are determined apart from liability—in the
event that the state court were to deem it
advisable. 
Moreover, while we understand the
desirability of taking steps to protect the
settlement agreement before a trial occurs,
13 Although we specifically address
PTO 2828, the most comprehensive order,
we expect that the District Court will
modify all orders at issue in this appeal so
that they are consistent with this opinion.
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the District Court is not without recourse
in the event that a verdict is rendered that
appears to grant punitive damages under
the guise of some other damage category.
The precise circumstances that might arise
are too speculative to discuss with
specificity.  But post-trial remedies should
not be categorically rejected.14
We recognize that the District
Court’s task is a difficult one, particularly
in light of the patent efforts by plaintiffs’
counsel to press against the damages
restrictions to which intermediate opt-outs
are bound.  But the Court’s power has to
be exercised consistent with the terms of
the notice and agreement on which
potential class members relied at the outset
of the process.  Moreover, it has to be
applied to the state courts with appropriate
consideration for limitations of equity,
federalism, and comity. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the
Court’s injunctions and remand with
instructions to modify them in accordance
with this opinion.
14 At oral argument, we raised the
question whether the District Court had
power after a verdict to limit or remit a
damage award that seemed so excessive
that it amounted to exemplary damages.
We particularly focused on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.  This decision is not the
proper place to consider fully the extent to
which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine might
circumscribe the District Court’s ability to
effectuate the agreement’s punitive
damages provision after a jury has
awarded a plaintiff damages.  We note,
however, that where “a federal court’s
proper exercise of its jurisdiction to
manage its cases has the secondary effect
of voiding a state court determination, it is
not a review of that order for purposes of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Diet Drugs
I, 282 F.3d at 242.  On the other hand, the
Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738, precludes a federal court from
reconsidering a state court’s judgment as
to the preclusive effect of a federal court
judgment. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First
Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986). 
